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ARTICLES
CORNERING THE MARKET IN A POST-9/11
WORLD: THE FUTURE OF HORIZONTAL
RESTRAINTS
DANIEL GOLDBERG*

INTRODUCTION

In the next few years, several widely prescribed drugs, such
as Prozac and Prilosec, will lose their patent protection,' allowing
equivalent generic drugs to penetrate the pharmaceutical drug
market. To extend their exclusive position in the market, brand
drug manufacturers have begun entering into agreements with
generic drug producers to delay the latter's entry into the market.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has expressed concern that
such agreements are plainly anticompetitive horizontal restraints
that violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' The FTC has
* Briefing Attorney, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Supreme Court of Texas. B.A.,
Wesleyan University, J.D,University of Houston Law Center. The author's
opinions do not represent the views of the Supreme Court of Texas or of any
individual Justice
1. See, e.g., "Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust
Implications of Patent Settlements", Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade
Commission before the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 24, 2001, available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/pharmtstmy.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003)
[hereinafter "FTC Statement"] (noting that "[w]ithin the next five years,
patents on brand-name drugs with combined U.S. sales approaching $20
billion will expire"). See also Congressional Budget Office, How Increased
Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the
PharmaceuticalIndustry, available at http://www.cbo.gov (last visited Mar. 29,
2002) (hereinafter "CBO Report") (same); Purple Pill Patents, (National Public
Radio audio broadcast, Apr. 18, 2002) (describing the Prilosec manufacturer's
(AstraZeneca) efforts to prevent generic entry into the market); A pill that
changed the world; Generic Drugs, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 2001, at 1
(discussing Eli Lilly's dilemma with Prozac's impending off-patent status).
2. See FTC Statement, supra note 1, at 4 (surveying several cases in which
"the Commission alleged that as part of a [patent] settlement agreement, the
branded firm made payments to the generic firm in exchange for delayed
entry"). These cases are explained in greater detail in Part II.B. In addition,
the FTC released a report on July 30, 2002, detailing its specific
recommendations for changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act, which regulates
generic drug production. See Federal Trade Commission News Release,
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filed several lawsuits and entered into several consent agreements
with brand drug manufacturers to curb the use of these
agreements.3
Underlying all of this is the complex relationship between
patents and antitrust law. Some brand drug manufacturers have
filed patent infringement lawsuits against generic drug
producers.4 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act,5 the statute principally
responsible for regulating generic drug production, filing a patent
infringement lawsuit delays generic drug entry into the market for
as long as two and a half years.6 Moreover, in the course of this
litigation, the parties often settle, and, as part of the settlement,
the generic drug producer agrees to delay entry into the market for
a further specified period of time.7 Concerned about this behavior,
the FTC has initiated legal action and has made detailed
recommendations for changing the current legal regime to prevent
such agreements!
This article examines the legality of agreements between
brand drug manufacturers and generic producers that delay
generic drug entry into the relevant market. More specifically,
this article explores the connection between patents,
pharmaceuticals, and antitrust policy in a post 9/11-world facing
an increased need for affordable pharmaceuticals to combat
potential acts of bio-terrorism. The 9/11-aspect is crucial to
FTC Recommends Legislative Changes to Hatch-Waxman Act, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2003).
See also infra Part IV.B (discussing FTC recommendations for

legislative changes).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., id. (explaining why brand drug manufacturers often initiate
patent infringement litigation against generic manufacturers in order to
forestall generic drug entry). See also Altman v. Bayer Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d
666, 668-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing Bayer's initiation of a patent

infringement lawsuit against a generic drug producer regarding the antibiotic
Cipro).

5. Act of Sept. 24, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1998) (codified
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc & 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)).
6. See discussion infra Part II (explaining the framework the Hatch-

Waxman Act creates).
7. See, e.g., Altman, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 669 (stating that the brand drug
and generic manufacturers entered into a settlement in which the generic
producer, Barr Laboratories, "agreed not to market its Cipro generic
equivalent in the United States or otherwise trigger the 180 day exclusivity
period in exchange for [the brand drug producer]'s promise to pay $24.5
million ... to Barr .... ").

8. See Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the
Knowledge-Based Economy, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/
index.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (exploring the interrelationship of
patents, intellectual property in biotechnology, and antitrust concerns). See
also FTC Report, supra note 1 (describing the study conducted by the FTC).
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understanding the evolutionary nature of antitrust because, in a
dialectical sense, 9/11 changed the thesis of antitrust enforcement
in the pharmaceutical market. This change is most clearly
illustrated with respect to the antibiotic Ciprofloxacin (Cipro), the
anti-anthrax drug that became a household name for unfortunate
reasons following 9/11. The Cipro debate, detailed in Part III,
which has taken on great importance since 9/11,' provides a useful
case study of the relationship between patent law, brand name
drugs, generic counterparts, and antitrust enforcement in the
general pharmaceutical market.
The horizontal restraints at issue here are relatively recent
phenomena and the FTC did not file its first complaint challenging
such conduct until May of 2000. Furthermore, the cases that have
been filed have had little time to develop through the judicial
system. Thus, instead of surveying case law, this article focuses
on the total context surrounding generic drug competition
specifically as it relates to Cipro. This article will survey all
relevant phenomena bearing on the generic drug competition
issue, including, but not limited to, the legislative, executive,
political, historical, economic, and judicial factors that inform the
question. The idea is to treat a question of antitrust policy as an
historical phenomenon that cannot be assessed solely in terms of
doctrine, but in view of the legal and social context the issue arises
within.'0
In assessing the legality of agreements that delay generic
entry into the market, this article addresses two questions. The
first question is whether patents on pharmaceuticals encourage or
discourage competition in the relevant market or markets. The
second question is whether courts will be more or less willing to
find antitrust violations by brand drug manufacturers in the post9/11 world.
To answer these two questions, this article will first contrast
the Hatch-Waxman Act's intent, history, and effects with the
philosophy behind patent protections in the pharmaceutical
industry. The article will then conduct an economic analysis of
pharmaceutical markets in relation to patents and generic drug
entry.
Finally, the article provides a historical analysis of
antitrust enforcement as applied to the Cipro litigation in a post9/11 legal culture.

9. See James Surowiecki, No Profit, No Cure, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 5,

2001, at 46 (rejecting emphatically DHHS Secretary Tommy Thompson's
threat "to break Bayer's patent on (Ciprol" if Bayer did not agree to sell the
drug to the U.S. at a below-market price).
10. See discussion infra Part IV.B (detailing the historical approach to anti-

trust).
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I. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A PRECARIOUS BALANCE
A. Background & Objectives of the Act
Any analysis of pharmaceuticals, patents, and competition
must begin with the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, which "was an
unprecedented attempt [by Congress] to achieve two seemingly
contradictory objectives, namely, 1) to make lower-costing generic
copies of approved drugs more widely available and 2) to assure
that there were adequate incentives to invest in the development
of new drugs.""
Conceptually speaking, there is obvious tension behind the
purposes of the federal patent system, and antitrust policy. "The
intersection of the patent and antitrust laws presents a formidable
paradox. The patent laws increase invention and innovation by
offering inventors a right to exclude. The antitrust laws foster
competition, sometimes through the condemnation of such
exclusion." 2 Thus, "[aictivity that may be encouraged under the
patent system frequently 1raises
the suspicion of the antitrust laws
3
by reducing competition."

The Hatch-Waxman Act is controversial because it attempts
to accomplish both of these seemingly mutually exclusive goals at
the same time. As prescription drug prices continue to rise and as
the post-9/11 world faces the all-too-real specter of bioterrorism,
one cannot overstate the importance of encouraging both
competition between pharmaceuticals and research and
development.
The power play between the generic and brand-name
pharmaceutical markets is clearly illustrated by the Act's
legislative process. As Professor Engelberg notes, "Each of the
patent provisions of the [1984] Act was born as part of a unique
legislative process which, in reality, was a congressionally
supervised negotiation between the generic and brand-name
pharmaceutical industries in which the parties were compelled to
reach a compromise by the legislature." 4 This history lends itself
to understanding how the Act has developed and its effects on the
rudiments of patent protection.
However, as Professor Engelberg argues, there is no
connection between patent protections and commercial benefits
because commercial benefit depends on a host of factors
11. Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals:
Have They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 389 (1999).
12. Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 761, 762-63 (2002).
13. Id. at 769.
14. Engelberg, supra note 11, at 391.
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extraneous to the existence and scope of patent protections. 1"

Thus, "there [is] no legal or logical relationship between the life of
a patent and the commercial life of any product claimed in a
patent." 6 This is the basis of Professor Engelberg's conclusion
that the special patent protections codified in the Act are
unwarranted and that patent law should not provide "corporate
welfare" to pharmaceutical manufacturers. 7
Prior to 1984, drug companies often sought FDA approval for
the manufacture of generic drugs "before the relevant patents
expired, even though it was necessary to make and use the
patented invention and thus commit acts amounting to literal
infringement as part of the process of seeking FDA approval." 8
Curiously, no cases exist prior to 1984 where a brand drug
manufacturer sued a generic drug producer for patent
infringement
when the latter sought FDA approval. 9
Furthermore, prior to 1984, the federal government provided no
clear process for FDA approval of generic drugs. "[B]y the early
1980s the approval of generic versions of existing drugs was an
uncertain process. The patents on many important drugs had
expired or were about to expire, and the prospect of competition in
the sale of those products
and of inevitably lower prices for
2
consumers was dim.

0

B. Nuts & Bolts of the Act
In 1984, after successful negotiations between the generic and

15. See id. (arguing that "[clommercial success actually depends upon a
multitude of other factors including the commercial practicality of the
invention, the state of development, [and] the existence of a market .....
16. Id. at 394.
17. Though the author sympathizes with Professor Engelberg's conclusion,
his inferences are not entirely convincing.
His argument ignores the
possibility that patent protections may be necessary yet not sufficient to effect
commercial success. While the provisions of a patent obviously do not
guarantee commercial success, it is not implausible to suggest that without
such protection, the willingness to innovate is at least dampened, and at most
derailed, due to the loss of the profit incentive. In the case of drugs like Cipro
that have become, at least popularly, vital in a post-9/11 world, curbing
innovation even slightly could have serious repercussions. In any case, I am
not here rejecting Professor Engelberg's argument, but only suggesting that
his premises do not seem unassailable. I will return to this perspective in
detail later in the Article. For now, it will suffice for the reader to understand
that one reason the Act is controversial is because some do perceive it as a
kind of corporate welfare, rather than as a necessary safeguard for drug
research and development.
18. Engelberg, supra note 11, at 395.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 397.
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Hatch-Waxman
Act.
President Reagan
current form
signed the bill into law on September 24, 1984.22
There are several important provisions of the Act. First, the
Act enables brand drug manufacturers to apply for "an extension
of their patent term...

[These] extensions ...

equal half of the

time the drug spent in clinical testing (usually a total of six to
eight years) plus all of the time it spent having the FDA review its
new drug application (usually about two years).2 4 Congress
intended for these patent extensions to offset the acts of
infringement that occur during the approval process.25
Second, the Act contains provisions aside from patent
extensions that work to postpone generic entry. To obtain FDA
approval, a putative generic drug producer must file an
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). 6
"Under the
abbreviated procedure, an ANDA applicant that demonstrates
bioequivalency [sic] with a pioneer drug may rely upon FDA
findings of safety and efficacy." 7 The FDA requires an ANDA
applicant to make one of four possible certifications regarding the
brand drug manufacturer's patent protections. 8 This Article (and
the FTC) is concerned only with certification IV.
A certification under paragraph IV requires the ANDA applicant to
give notice of the ANDA filing to the patent owner and the firm that
obtained the new drug approval for the listed drug (typically the
pioneer manufacturer).
This notice must include a detailed
21. Engelberg, supra note 11, at 405. Professor Engelberg explains that
[b]y early August 1984, it became clear that no law would be enacted
unless a compromise could be negotiated directly between the generic
and brand-name factions. Accordingly, Senator Hatch placed heavy
pressure on representatives of the two sides to reach agreement and
ultimately acted as a referee and arbitrator on the final points of
disagreement.

Id.
22. Id. at 406.
23. Id. at 407.
24. CBO Report, supra note 1, at xiii-xiv.
25. See id. at 4 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2000)).
26. See FTC Statement, supra note 1 (noting that ANDA is designed to
protect companies' innovations while encouraging competition). See also Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676-78 (1990) (tracing the
framework imposed by the Hatch-Waxman Act); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Royce Labs., Inc., 69 F.3d 1130, 1131-32 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same).
27. FTC Statement, supra note 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (1994)). The
alert reader will no doubt have noticed the free-rider problem lurking in the

statutory scheme insofar as imitators are free to rely on the brand drug
manufacturers' investments in proving safety and efficacy. For discussion of

the implications of the free-rider problem as to pharmaceuticals, and the role
patent protections play in reducing the problem, see Part III.A.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2000).
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statement of the factual and legal basis for the ANDA applicant's
opinion that the patent is not invalid, is unenforceable, or will not be
infringed. 9
Once a would-be generic drug manufacturer files a paragraph
IV certification with the FDA, two provisions at the heart of the
current FTC concern become relevant. First, if the patent owner
brings a patent infringement lawsuit against the ANDA applicant
within forty-five days of receiving notice of the paragraph IV
certification, the FDA may not approve an ANDA for thirty
months. The only exception to this time period occurs if a court
gives a final order as to the infringement suit, or if a court orders a
longer or shorter period." Second,
[t]he Act grants to the first ANDA filer a 180-day period during
which it has the exclusive right to market a generic version of the
brand name drug. The 180-day exclusivity period begins running on
the earlier of (1) the date the first ANDA filer begins commercial
marketing of the generic drug, or (2) the date a court decides the
patent addressed by the paragraph IV certification is invalid or not
infringed3.
Perhaps most importantly, "[n]o other generic manufacturer
may obtain final FDA approval to market its version of the
relevant product until the first filer's 180-day exclusivity period
has expired."31 Understanding how the statutory provisions work
is made easier by considering several fact patterns. The following
section describes scenarios that apply the Act's provisions.
C. Cases & Controversies
Generally, the FTC disapproves of abuses by petitioners
during the paragraph IV certification process. Consider the
following hypothetical.
At T1 (Time One), a putative generic drug producer files an
ANDA with paragraph IV certification. The patent owner and the
firm that obtained the new drug approval receive the requisite
notice at T. Within forty-five days of receiving this notice, at T3,
the brand drug manufacturer files a patent infringement lawsuit,
essentially disputing the paragraph IV certification. This delays
any generic entry into the market for thirty months, unless a court
decides the matter in the interim. Finally, at T4 , as part of the
"settlement" agreement, the ANDA filer agrees not to market a

29. FTC Statement, supra note 1. See also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2000)
(giving applicant notice requirements); 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(c)(6) (2002)
(requiring a detailed statement of facts and law from the applicant).
30. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(c), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000).
31. FTC Statement, supra note 1, at 4.
32. See id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000)).
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generic version of the brand drug for some indefinite period of time
in exchange for compensation. Part of this settlement agreement
includes the ANDA filer's agreement not to transfer or assign its
180-day exclusivity rights under the Act.
Under this set of facts, the brand drug manufacturer has
essentially insured that no generic version of its pharmaceutical
will enter the market.
First, the initiation of the patent
infringement lawsuit prevents the FDA from approving the ANDA
for two and a half years. Given that brand drugs enjoy market
exclusivity for the duration of the patent, an extra two and half
years with no competition is significant. Second, and more
important, if the initial ANDA filer agrees not to market its
generic drug, no other generic version can legally enter the market.
This result follows because the 180-day exclusivity period grants
the initial ANDA filer the right to market its generic drug for 180
days without any other generic drug competition, as to the specific
drug sought to be produced under the ANDA. The exclusivity
period does not begin to run until either the generic drug producer
markets its drug or a court decides against the patent owner on
the infringement claim. The settlement agreement ensures that
neither of the two ways that the exclusivity period can begin to
run will ever come to fruition. By settling, the generic drug
producer agrees not to market its drug, the first way the
exclusivity period may begin to run, and the brand drug
manufacturer obviously avoids an unfavorable judicial disposition,
the second way the exclusivity period begins to run. It is as if the
generic market for the drug at issue is in suspended animation,
with the exclusivity period permanently tolled. So long as the
brand drug manufacturer settles with the initial ANDA filer, the
exclusivity period will never begin to run, effectively removing
generic drug competition from the market.
This phenomenon is certainly not hypothetical. The FTC filed
three complaints in the last three years challenging very similar
fact patterns to the scenario described above. The FTC filed the
first of these in May of 2000 against Abbott Laboratories and
Geneva Pharmaceuticals. 33 "The complaint charged that Abbot[t]
paid Geneva approximately $4.5 million per month to keep
Geneva's generic version of Abbot[t]'s proprietary drug (Hytrin) off
the U.S. market.... 34 The complaint further alleged that Geneva
agreed not to enter the market until either the final resolution of
the patent infringement litigation or the entry of another generic
Hytrin product." Geneva also agreed not to transfer or assign its

33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.
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exclusivity rights as the first ANDA filer.36 "These provisions
ensured that no other company's generic version of Hytrin could
obtain FDA approval and enter the market during the term of the
agreement, because Geneva's agreement not to launch its product
meant the 180-day exclusivity period would not begin to run."37
Subsequent to the complaint, Abbott and Geneva signed a consent
decree essentially invalidating the agreement.38
The two other cases in which the FTC filed a complaint both
involved a similar kind of settlement, arising out of patent
infringement litigation, entered into by the brand drug
manufacturer and the generic producer.39 In each of these cases,
the brand drug manufacturer compensated the generic drug
producer in exchange for the latter's agreement to delay entry into
the relevant pharmaceutical market.0
The Cipro litigation follows the same pattern.
Bayer
Corporation, the manufacturer of Cipro, filed a patent
infringement lawsuit against the initial ANDA filet, Barr
Laboratories."' During the pendency of the litigation, the FDA
tentatively approved of Barr's ANDA application, which meant
that Barr was legally entitled to market its generic if the patent
litigation was resolved in its favor.42 Prior to a final judicial
resolution, Bayer agreed to pay Barr $24.5 million in exchange for
the latter's promise "not to market its Cipro generic equivalent in
the United States or otherwise trigger the 180 day exclusivity
period." 3 The result, as in the cases described above, "was to
foreclose any 4 Cipro generic equivalent competition from entering
the market."
A prima facie analysis shows that the agreements described
above all act as horizontal restraints because the agreement
between the generic drug producer and the brand drug
manufacturer serve to keep the generic version off the market.
Presumably, once the generic enters the market, the supply of the
drug in question will increase, depressing prices. The plaintiff in
Altman sued under precisely this theory of the case-that

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.; Carderm Capital L.P.; and Andrx
Corp., Docket No. 9293 (Apr. 2, 2001); In re Schering-Plough Corp. et al.,
Docket No. 9297 (Mar. 16, 2000).
40. See FTC Staement, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining how the brand drug

manufacturers paid the generic drug producers to delay the latter's access into
the market).
41. Altman v. Bayer Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
42. Id.
43. Id.

44. Id.
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consumers "were injured by paying prices for Cipro that were
'supracompetitive,' i.e., substantially higher than the prices that
Plaintiff and members of the Class would have paid absent the
allegedly deceptive and misleading stipulation."'
However, as the Supreme Court has observed numerous
times, the mere existence of high prices is insufficient to establish
a Section 1 violation." Rather, the analysis must focus squarely
on the effects of the restraint in question.47 Though it seems
difficult to discern, at first glance, how an agreement to restrict
output of a given product has largely pro-competitive effects,
appearances can be misleading. First, there is a question as to the
cross-elasticity of demand as to brand drug prices versus
prescription drug prices.48 Second, the agreements at issue merely
extend the brand drug's market exclusivity. This is precisely what
patent protections are designed to do, bestow upon the patent
owner the right to exclude others from using the invention for the
life of the patent. 9
Is such market exclusivity inherently
anticompetitive?
The pharmaceutical industry emphatically
answers in the negative, and holds instead that the protections
codified in the Hatch-Waxman Act are pro-competitive to the
extent they encourage research and development.5
Sufficient analysis of the effects of agreements that delay
generic entry into the market necessitates economic inquiry into
the pharmaceutical industry.
Fortunately, in 1998, the
nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) completed a
detailed economic analysis of the effects of generic drug entry into
pharmaceutical markets.

45. Id. at 673.
46. E.g., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346
U.S. 537, 541 (1954) (holding that high prices alone do not establish anti-

competitive activity).
47. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)
(providing the famous aphorism that "[tihe true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition.")
48. See infra notes 72-80 (elaborating on market segmentation and demand
elasticity).
49. See Engelberg, supra note 11, at 393 (striking a balance between the

wide spread availability of low cost generic drugs and incentive to invest in
research for new medications).
50. See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing the procompetitive nature of
patents).
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II. THE ECONOMICS OF GENERIC DRUG ENTRY

A. PricingObjectives & a Free-RiderProblem
The federal government has two competing policy objectives with
respect to the pricing of prescription drugs. On the one hand, it
wants to ensure that companies have enough incentive to invest in
researching and developing innovative drugs. On the other hand, it
wants to discourage them from charging excessively high prices. In
general, the government achieves the first goal through a patent
system that grants market exclusivity for a limited period of time,
allowing companies to recoup their investment in [research and
development]. For the second goal, it relies on competition between
similar drugs to hold prices down. 51
According to Professor Engelberg, these goals are consistent
with the legislative purpose underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act. 2
However, a free-rider problem is implicit in the tension between
these goals, particularly in industries where innovation is crucial.
Conducting research and development and bringing an invention to
market often are lengthy and expensive processes, with no
guarantees of success at the end of the tunnel. And on those
occasions where success is achieved, 'free riders' who did not make
any such investments might imitate the hard-earned innovation and
appropriate its value for themselves. 3
Brand drug manufacturers perceive federal patent protections
as the chief weapon in reducing the free-rider problem.
In
economic terms,
intellectual property is a public good. That is, it is nonrival
(consumption by one person does not leave any less of the good to be
consumed by others) and nonexclusive (others cannot be excluded
from consuming it). As a result ... public goods tend to be...
subject to free riders, who are tempted to imitate the invention after
it has been developed. 4
The patent extensions and market exclusivity provisions of
the Hatch-Waxman Act are intended to reduce the free rider
problem insofar as the Act tempers generic producers' ability to
imitate (or delay) the invention after it has been developed. This

51. CBO Report, supra note 1, at 13. Though the author does not have the
requisite background to judge the methodological worth of this study, it is the
most comprehensive study of the effects of generic drug entry on
pharmaceutical pricing the author has located.
52. See Engelberg, supra note 11, at 389 (stating that the legislation
attempted to achieve increases in both the availability of generic drugs and
incentives to develop new drugs).
53. Carrier, supra note 12, at 766-67.
54. Id. at 767 (footnotes omitted).
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objective is all the more important in the pharmaceutical
paradigm because, as Professor Carrier points out, "once [a] drug
is developed, it is easy for free-riding competitors to replicate this
work."5 The free riding problem is legitimate and is at the core of
brand drug manufacturers' claims that firms in the market will
correct for the free riding problem in the most efficient manner.
When left to its own devices, the brand drug producer ("A") will
negotiate with the generic producer ("B") to keep the generic drug
off of the market. Doing so eliminates some competition, thereby
eliminating at least one imitator's ability to free ride on, e.g., A's
safety and efficacy findings. Free rider or not, B's legal right to
compete is valuable, and A compensates B for B's relinquishment
of it. In any case, the scenario is pareto optimal. Both A and B are
better off, and neither are worse off.
Understanding why an effective balance of the two aims of
federal drug pricing policy is so difficult to attain requires a deeper
analytic and economic comprehension of generic drug entry and its
effects on brand drug pricing. Before moving to the CBO's
analysis of the effect of generic entry on brand drug pricing, it is
first necessary to survey some important characteristics of the
overall pharmaceutical industry and its relevant markets.
B. Managed Care & PharmaceuticalMarket Analysis
The structure of the managed care industry is designed to
exert downward pressure on pharmaceutical prices. Managed care
organizations' (MCOs) use pharmacy benefit manager (PBMs) to
exert this pressure." MCOs subcontract with PBMs to negotiate
superior prescription drug prices, and extends the right to the
PBM to do so for the MCOs entire patient network. 7 "In return for
channeling their patient base to particular pharmacies, they
arrange to pay lower retail prices for drugs at those pharmacies."58
"PBMs are able to negotiate rebates from manufacturers of
brand-name drugs based on their ability to steer their members
towards a particular drug. . . .
These rebates are one way PBMs
achieve savings on prices ultimately paid by the MCOs for its
members. The second way is the lower retail prices achieved by
the PBMs enhanced bargaining power.6" Yet a third way PBMs
force drug prices down is through generic drug substitution.61
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
PMBs
61.

Id. at 836.
CBO Report, supra note 1, at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (stating how MCOs use
to negotiate lower prices).
CBO Report, supra note 1, at 8.
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PBMs often provide financial incentives to pharmacists for using
generic drugs and encourage consumers to request generic drugs."
PBMs do so "by charging a higher copayment for... brand-name
drugs chosen over generic substitutes."6 3
The essential point is that the structure of managed care
exerts downward pressure on drug prices. The overall effect of
this pressure may be doubted, given the ever-rising drug prices,
but the pressure exists, at least in theory. This is important
because it gives credence to brand drug manufacturers' claims that
market forces are arrayed against increasing prescription drug
prices over the long term. Moreover, given PBMs' use of generic
drugs as a weapon in depressing drug prices, the relevance of the
brand drug producers' contentions that generic drugs depress drug
prices and thereby stifle innovation is obvious. In other words, the
structure of the managed care industry facilitates generic drug
entry into the market.64
Furthermore, as in any antitrust analysis, the relevant
market must be defined. A preliminary analysis indicates that the
pharmaceutical market is not highly concentrated. 5 "The four
largest manufacturers of innovative drugs each accounted for only
6 percent to 7 percent of total U.S. pharmaceutical sales in 1994.
And the top 10 companies together shared just 56 percent of the
market."66 However, these statistics are misleading. It is difficult
to understand, for example, how a drug used to correct heart
arrythmia competes with a drug used to treat asthma. Obviously
an individual cannot use one drug to treat both conditions
(assuming the drug is only efficacious as to one of the conditions).
A more accurate assessment, then, requires segmenting the
pharmaceutical industry into related classes of drugs. "When
pharmaceutical sales are divided into narrower submarkets, in
which products are grouped only with their immediate
competitors, much higher concentration becomes apparent."67
Figure 1 represents this assessment."6 The CBO surveyed sixty-six
therapeutic classes. 69 "In just over half of those classes, the top

62. Id.
63. Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
64. See id. (footnote omitted) (noting that some HMOs actually require
generic drug substitution for brand drugs, if available).
65. Id. at 22.
66. Id. (footnote omitted).
67. Id. See also Richard G. Frank, PrescriptionDrug Prices: Why Do Some
Pay More Than Others Do? An Accurate Understandingof Price Differences Is
Essential to the Crafting of Sound Prescription Drug Policies, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr., 2001, at 121 (analyzing differential prescription drug

prices by defining the relevant market based on therapeutic segments).
68. CBO Report, supra note 1, at 23, fig. 5.

69. Id. at 22.
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three innovator drugs accounted for 80 percent or more of retail
pharmacy sales in their class. In only nine of the classes did the
top three innovator drugs make up less than 50 percent of their
pharmacy market."" (Figure 1).
A 1997 study preceded the CBO's analysis as to segmentation
of pharmaceutical markets, reaching similar conclusions.71
Professor Manning's analysis also goes to an important indicator
of market definition, elasticity of demand. He observes that
[on the one hand, it is possible that generics compete directly with
brand name drugs, thus increasing the elasticity of demand for and
reducing the price of branded products. On the other hand, it is
possible that generic substitutes create segmented markets. The
seller of a branded product may face a smaller but more inelastic
demand. Consequently, price may be higher than it would be in the
absence of generic substitutes.72
This analysis is important for several reasons.
First,
Professor Manning concludes that "the market segmentation
argument applies in the United States. 72 Second, and more
importantly, is the notion that brand drugs may not compete
directly with generic substitutes, but enjoy greater inelastic
demand in smaller, more segmented markets.74 It follows from
this that generic drug entry actually causes brand drug prices to
rise: "generics raise branded drug prices."71
CBO's analysis
confirms Professor Manning's results, and explains the mechanism
by which this occurs.
"[Pirices of brand-name drugs do rise faster than inflation for
many purchasers after generic entry .... 76 How is this possible?
Once generic drugs enter the market, price-sensitive consumers
will switch to the generic version.7 7 As this occurs, "demand for
the original brand-name drug declines and may become less
sensitive to price. If that happens, the price of the brand-name
drug could theoretically rise more quickly over time than it would
have without generic competition., 78 CBO's analysis does show
that brand drug manufacturers increase discounts to retailers
after generic entry, leading to the conclusion that though brand
drug prices continue to increase at a hyperinflationary rate even

70. Id. at 22-23 (footnote omitted).
71. Richard L. Manning, Products Liability and PrescriptionDrug Prices in
Canada and the United States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 203, 214-15 (1997).
72. Id.

73. Id. at 217.
74. Id. at 214-15.
75. Id. at 217.
76. CBO Report, supra note 1, at 29.

77. Id.
78. Id.
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after generic entry, "some purchasers pay less for those drugs after
generic entry."79
This point is crucial, as it undermines a superficially
reasonable thesis: that generic drug competition lowers brand
drug prices. Indeed, this is precisely the claim that the plaintiffs
made in Altman v. Bayer Corp.8" However, this analysis presents
something of an enigma. Namely, if generic competition does not
lower brand drug prices, why are brand drug manufacturers
driven to enter into agreements with generic drug producers to
delay generic entry into the market? If CBO and Professor
Manning are correct, proper economic analysis dictates that brand
drug manufacturers ought to encourage generic drug entry,
because such entry raises brand drug prices.
There are several answers to this question. The first answer
involves pricing of generic drugs, as opposed to brand drugs. "As
generic drugs are substituted for their more expensive brand-name
counterparts, the average price of a prescription falls ....
[GIeneric substitution lowered the average cost for a multiplesource prescription by $11. "81 The fact that brand drug prices rise
after generic entry does not alter the intuitive, empirically correct
notion that generic drugs are far cheaper than brand name
drugs.82
79. Id.
80. 125 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
81. CBO Report, supra note 1, at 28.
82. Id. See also Melissa K. Davis, Note and Comment, Monopolistic
Tendencies of Brand-Name Drug Companies in the PharmaceuticalIndustry,
15 J.L. & COM. 357, 365 (1995) (imparting that "switching from a brand-name
drug to a generic drug results in a savings of between thirty and fifty
percent"); Patricia M. Danzon & Li-Wei Chao, Does Regulation Drive Out
Competition in PharmaceuticalMarkets? 43 J.L. & ECON. 311, 312 (2000)
("Generic competition on off-patent drugs offers the potential for significant
savings to consumers.").
Danzon & Chao report a marked effect on
prescription drug prices overall in the United States: "[tihe price elasticity
with respect to the number of generic competitors in the United States is -.50."
Danzon & Chao, supra, at 339. The authors of the study are primarily
interested in showing that more regulated pharmaceutical markets produce a
steeper decline of price.... Generic competition has a significant
negative effect on price for the United States and other countries with
relatively free pricing.., whereas for the countries with strict price
regulation... the number of generic competitors has either no effect or
a positive effect on prices.
Id. at 354-55.
More recently, the FTC confirmed the price effects of generic drugs in a
report released on July 30, 2002. The FTC cited a 1997 study showing "higher
prices for brand-name prescription drugs (in light of factors such as inelastic
demand among users of brand-name products), but large decreases in the
prices of corresponding generic drugs." Federal Trade Commission, Generic
Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OO2/O7/genericdrugstudy.pdf, at 9 (last visited Aug. 12,
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Furthermore, generic drugs rapidly gain market share when
introduced to the market formerly occupied exclusively by a
patented brand name drug.83 CBO studied twenty-one brand name
drugs that faced competition from generic drugs between 1991 and
1993.84 "For seven of [these] drugs.., generics had gained 65
percent or more of the innovator's market by 1994. "88
Furthermore, CBO's data indicates that "[iun 1980, generic drugs
accounted for only around 13 percent of the total quantity of
prescriptions sold for multiple-source drugs ... fourteen years
later, they constituted 58 percent of the total quantity of multiplesource prescriptions dispensed.... .86 This is obviously a marked
gain in market share. (Figure 2). It makes sense, then, that
brand drug manufacturers are concerned enough with generic
competition to horizontally restrain prescription drug output by
delaying generic entry into the market.
A producer, for example, may invest twenty-five dollars in
developing widgets. He may decide to sell widgets for fifty dollars.
However, if he sells a widget to only five consumers, his returns
are not as valuable as a producer who charges twenty-five dollars
but reaches (sells to) ninety-five consumers.
The fact that
prescription drug prices may increase at a hyperinflationary rate
does not alter the brand drug manufacturers' concern that their
returns decrease in rough proportion to their market share."
The second reason brand drug manufacturers want to
restrain generic drug entry turns to brand drug manufacturers'
chief ammunition in defending the pro-competitiveness of brand
drug exclusivity: returns on innovation.
Specifically, CBO
analysis indicates that "the increase in generic market share since
1984 has decreased the total returns from marketing a new drug
by about $27 million, on average."88 "Expressed as a percentage,
the $27 million decline in returns equals roughly 12 percent of the
total average returns from marketing a new drug." 9 Nevertheless,
the patent extensions provided for by the Hatch-Waxman Act help

2002) (citing Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the
Pricingof Pharmaceuticals,6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 75-90 (1997)).
83. CBO Report, supra note 1, at 28.
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 37.
87. See Jith Jayaratne & Phillip E. Strahan, Entry Restrictions, Industry
Evolution, and Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence from Commercial Banking, 41
J.L. & ECON. 239, 242 (1998) (observing that the easing of entry barriers
caused some banks to lose profits and market share to more efficient

producers).
88. CBO Report, supra note 1, at 38.
89. Id.
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offset the decline to some extent.9" "On average, therefore, the
returns from marketing a new drug would probably still fully
cover the capitalized costs of [research and development] despite
the increase in generic sales since 1984." 9'
The decline in returns is obviously of concern to brand drug
manufacturers for economic reasons. However, brand drug
manufacturers assert that the decline in returns is a social and
medical problem, rather than simply a competitive challenge to
the respective business model. "Although the Act specifically
purports to promote new [research and development] investment,
this report implies that its effects may in fact deter [research and
development] development
by lowering returns on an already
92
risky investment."

90. Id.
91. Id. at 47.
92. Nicholas Groombridge and Ruth Atherton, The Hatch-Waxman Act:
Bonus for Brand Names or Godsend for Generics, available at http://www.
corporateintelligence.com/issues.cfm?story=43584&author=Groombridge
(last
visited Mar. 27, 2002). See also PhRMA Industry Profile 2002, available at
http://www.phrma.orgpublications/publications/profileO2/index.cfm, at 17 (last
visited May 1, 2002) (explaining that drug development is a "long, risky, and
expensive" process) [hereinafter "PhRMA Report"]. But cf. CBO Report, supra
note 1, at 47 (noting that only the few drugs that were barely profitable to
begin with are no longer profitable after generic entry). To the extent CBO is
correct, it seems that allocative efficiency is better served by facilitating
generic entry into the market: resources will not be wasted on drugs that
society does not demand enough to render the drugs profitable.
At least one commentator goes further than CBO and argues that proper
economic analysis demonstrates that the economic behavior of the brand drug
manufacturers themselves that reduces returns on R&D. F.M. Scherer
argues:
A robust pattern persists. Combined with evidence that profit rates of
return on pharmaceutical industry R&D investments tend to exceed
risk-adjusted capital costs by only modest amounts, the pattern suggests
that pharmaceutical industry R&D is best described by a virtuous rentseeking model. That is, as profit opportunities expand, firms compete to
exploit them by increasing R&D investments, and perhaps also
promotional costs, until the increases in costs dissipate most, if not all,
supranormal profit returns. If this is a correct interpretation of the
industry's behavior, it has self-evident implications for policy
interpretations aimed at reducing industry prices and profits.
F.M. Scherer, The Link Between Gross Profitabilityand PharmaceuticalR&D
Spending; An Analysis That Answers the Question: What Does the
PharmaceuticalIndustry Really Do With Its Profits?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Sept.Oct. 2001, 216, 220 (footnote omitted).
Professor Scherer's analysis here suggests that firms increase R&D
investments where the economic forecast may allow a favorable return on
investment. Such increase in capital expenditures decreases the firm's margin
and decreases returns on the R&D investment. If this is correct, it casts some
doubt on the accuracy of the brand drug producers' claims that it is the
behavior of generic producers (rather than their own rent-seeking behavior)
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To recapitulate, the economic analysis illustrates the
following:
" On the demand side, managed care exerts downward
pressure on prescription drug prices;
* The relevant pharmaceutical market must be segmented
by therapeutic class;
* Market analysis illustrates that generic entry actually
raises brand drug prices (brand drug price demand is
inelastic);
* Generic drugs rapidly gain substantial market share
subsequent to entry into the relevant market;
" Generic drug entry lowers returns on brand drugs, but
brand-drug manufacture remains profitable, albeit at a
lower margin.
Where does this economic analysis leave us? First, on the
macro level, one must not forget that prescription drug prices, both
generic and brand drug, continue to rise." Second, to the extent
brand drug prices are higher after generic entry, it makes little
sense for brand drug manufacturers to delay generic entry in order
to charge supracompetitive prices.
Third, brand drug
manufacturers face competition from generic drugs in terms of the
latter's rapid gain of market share after entry into the market.
Fourth, brand drug manufacturers continue to fully capitalize on
the costs of research and development for all but the most
marginal of pharmaceuticals.
III.

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT:

A

HISTORICAL APPROACH

A. Patent ProtectionsHave Pro-competitiveEffects
The first step in the legal analysis of the economic data
canvassed above is to return to the question that necessitated
economic inquiry: do patents generally have pro-competitive or
anti-competitive effects?
Though there are some, such as

that decreases R&D returns. See Margaret A. Peteraf & Randal Reed, Pricing
and Performance In Monopoly Airline Markets, 37 J.L. & ECON. 193, 197
(1994) (observing that "[s]trategic models of dominance suggest that
incumbents may invest in assets that cannot be replicated easily without

significant lags and/or sunk expenditures.").
The economic data is thus somewhat inconsistent on the nature and
cause of declining R&D returns. Nevertheless, even given Professor Scherer's
point, CBO's analysis, as well as the obviously biased brand drug producers'
analysis, suggests that generic competition plays some role in decreasing

returns on R&D. More detailed and thorough economic analysis is required to
delineate the extent of generic competition's effect.
93. See Engelberg, supra note 11, at 391 (noting that the price of
prescription drugs increased 10.1 percent).
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Professor Engelberg, who feel that the patent extensions and
9
market exclusivity of the Hatch-Waxman Act are unnecessary, 4
CBO's analysis suggests that such protections offset the effect of
generic gains in market share after generic entry.95 In turn, it
follows from this that the right to exclude generics from the
market is at least relevant to brand drug manufacturers' ability to
capitalize on the costs of research and development. This, of
course, is one of the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and is
inextricably linked with the purpose of patent protection.
To the extent patents do provide some incentive to expend
capital on research and development, even if the effect is not as
substantial as brand drug manufacturers would contend, patents
do have pro-competitive effects in the pharmaceutical industry.
Contrary to Professor Engelberg's argument, it does not follow
from the fact that patents are insufficient to guarantee commercial
success that patents are not necessary as an incentive to expend
capital on research and development. This is all the more true in
an economic climate in which the returns on brand drugs are
shrinking, at least insofar as generic drugs enter the given
market.
Insofar as patents encourage more and varied
pharmaceutical manufacturers to innovate and allocate resources
to research and development, there is undoubtedly some procompetitive effect from patents and the market exclusivity
provisions of the Act.
This, however, is just the beginning of the inquiry. The fact
that the protections benefiting brand drug manufacturers in the
Act may have some pro-competitive effects does not mean that
agreements to delay generic entry into the market are either legal
or desirable. The fact remains that agreements between generic
and brand drug producers to delay generic entry into the market
are hardly the legal equivalent of patent extensions enshrined in
statutory law. The effect of each may be to ensure market
exclusivity, but the entire point of patent protection, and of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, is to achieve an appropriate balance between
competition and enabling an innovator manufacturer to capitalize
on its investment. 96
Horizontal restraints of the type that concern the FTC surely
advance one of these two goals-increasing the brand drug
manufacturers' margin-but arguably at the expense of restricting

94. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (noting that a patent

protection does not guarantee commercial success).
95. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that returns from the

sale of new drugs would diminish and would no longer provide incentive for
research and development).
96. See Carrier, supra note 12, at 762-63 (discussing the objectives of the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act).
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consumers' ability to purchase cheaper generic drugs in a
competitive market. Recall the point that the two goals of the
Hatch-Waxman Act are at the very least mutually inconsistent
and are possibly mutually exclusive. 7 Thus, the antitrust question
of brand drugs versus generic drugs becomes one of prioritization:
should society place more weight on brand drug manufacturers'
right (and society's need) to capitalize on its research and
development, or on consumers' rights to purchase cheaper generic
drugs in a more competitive market?
The Cipro case is useful to answer this question. Why Cipro?
First, it is timely and intriguing. Second, in the wake of 9/11,
society's need for the drug reached urgent levels-lending
ammunition to the brand drug manufacturers' claims that
innovation needed to produce new and superior drugs, particularly
antibiotics, are directly linked to returns on research and
development that are diminished by generic entry." Third, any
proper antitrust analysis cannot be viewed in a vacuum, divorced
from context. Antitrust law is best perceived as an evolutionary
doctrine, and understanding a particular antitrust question is
impossible outside of an understanding of the context the issue
arises in. The Cipro debate frames this point neatly.
B. The HistoricalApproach to Antitrust Analysis
The Sherman Act and its companion regulations are beautiful in
their sparse simplicity. The interpretation of competition protection
has largely been left in the hands of judges and regulators, who
have relied over time on economists' analyses of how competition
operates in particular markets and, correspondingly, on popular
perceptions of what competition protection means.
Professor Swanson's point is that the fluid, evolutionary

97. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying

text (illustrating the

conflicting goals of antitrust law and patent protection).
98. See Surowiecki, supra note 9, at 46 (arguing that after 9/11 patents may
be broken with ease). Indeed,
[n]ow more than ever we want to encourage drug companies to devote

their considerable resources to antibiotic R & D, rather than to another
treatment for baldness or impotence. Is this the moment to inform them
that if they come up with something of genuine worth, something we
vitally need, we may just decide to break their patent?
Id. See also Joseph P. Reid, Note, A Generic Drug Price Scandal: Too Bitter A
Pill For the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act to
Swallow?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309, 339 (1999) (concluding that "society

must accept that, despite the cost, it will only be medically prepared for the
new millennium by encouraging the pioneer industry to expand research and
development.").
99. Carol B. Swanson, Antitrust Excitement in the New Millennium:
Microsoft, Mergers, and More, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 285, 325 (2001).
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nature of antitrust law stems from the sparse statutory language
itself. "[Antitrust law has been a fluid-and often controversialconcept since its birth in the late nineteenth century's industrial
age. Its substantive application has shifted radically over time
due to changes in the economy, the political climate, popular views
of 'big business', and developments in economic theory." °°
It is not particularly fruitful to attempt to understand a
particular antitrust question purely in terms of doctrine,
precedent, or theory. "If we want to know how antitrust has
affected us, we should look to history and not to theoretical
critiques of particular decisions." 1
Understanding the
controversy between generic drugs and brand drugs requires more
than a mere examination of the economic or theoretical effects of
generic drug entry on pricing. Rather, one must understand the
particular question's locus on the historical continuum, the context
in which the issue arises. "A historical approach to evaluating the
economic impact of antitrust law must look at the evolution of an
industry or the economy as a whole. The historical approach
evaluates antitrust's role in the broader context of economic
development." 2
C. The IntragovernmentalDiscourse Regarding Generic Drug
Competition
The Cipro debate operates as a superb prism for viewing the
conflict between generic drugs and brand drugs in a historical
context.
This is because the nature of the issue changed
dramatically in the space of several months. The historical
analysis posits that federal enforcement moves in cycles.'
Understanding the potential for antitrust enforcement requires
comprehension, inter alia, of a particular administration's
competition philosophy.
For example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt "declared war on
cartels and monopolies across the economy."0 4
In contrast,
President Reagan's administration adopted "the Chicago School's
approach," and antitrust enforcement approached dormancy
during the 1980s.1' President G.H.W. Bush to some extent, and
President Clinton to a greater extent, each revived antitrust

100. Id. at 287.
101. Peter C. Carstensen, How to Assess the Impact of Antitrust on the
American Economy: Examining History or Theorizing?, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1175,

1194 (1989).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Swanson, supra note 99, at 291 (describing the cycles of

antitrust enforcement since the Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted).
104. Id. at 293.
105. Id. at 294-95.
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10 6
enforcement as an important aspect of overall consumer welfare.
Current President G.W. Bush generally "indicates a preference for
deregulation, but does support government intervention to break
up monopolies."" 7
Given the pro-deregulation, laissez faire approach of the
current administration, it is doubtful that many antitrust scholars
would have predicted in August of 2001 that a member of the
President's Cabinet would threaten to break a brand drug
manufacturer's patent if it did not reduce its prices on a particular
drug. To term such a phenomenon the epitome of aggressive
government involvement seems an understatement. Aggressive
antitrust enforcement is often measured by the number of DOJ
lawsuits or FTC complaints filed. More drastic action occurred in
late October 2001, when the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS), Tommy Thompson, threatened "to break Bayer
[Corporation's] patent on" Cipro if it did not agree to reduce the
price on sales to the federal government.'
Never mind complaints
or even litigation, here a cabinet member of an economically
laissez faire President threatened to override a firm's
pharmaceutical patent.
Secretary Thompson did not follow through on his threat,
because he "cut a deal with the Bayer Corporation to buy a huge
batch of the anti-anthrax drug Cipro at ninety-five cents a tablet,
half what Bayer had been asking."" 9 The pro-competitive effects of
patent protections and the importance of maximizing Bayer's
returns on research and development to encourage innovation
paled in importance to the perceived need for the government to
stockpile the anti-anthrax drug Cipro in the post-9/11
environment."0
The central point is that evaluating Bayer's agreement to
delay the entry of generic Cipro produced by Barr Labs requires an
understanding of the federal government's willingness to enforce
antitrust policy as to generic drugs in the post-9/11 world. Again,

106. Id. at 296. The author uses the term "consumer welfare" in the nontechnical sense of the word.
107. Id. at 297.
108. Surowiecki, supra note 9, at 46.

109. Id.
110. Indeed, Canada actually did break Bayer's patent on Cipro. See Amy
Harmon & Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: The Treatment; Canada
Overrides Patentfor Cipro to Treat Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al

(discussing that "these are extraordinary and unusual times," which call for

extreme measures). See also Donna M. Gitter, InternationalConflicts Over
Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European
Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-UseExemption, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1691 n.381 (2001) (discussing the federal government's

ability to utilize compulsory licensing to counter bioterrorism).
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the brand drug-generic drug issue has been treated according to
the core duality underpinning the debate: what is the proper
balance between encouraging research and development (via
patent extensions and market exclusivity) and encouraging
generic competition to lower prescription drug prices for
consumers? This article contends that any answer that ignores
the government's willingness to enforce antitrust policy is fatally
flawed. Specifically, an analysis of the Cipro litigation requires an
understanding of the government's urgent desire to maintain an
uninterrupted supply of Cipro, to allay bioterrorism concerns.
Where the Secretary of HHS is willing to break Bayer's
patent on Cipro, how will federal courts treat antitrust complaints
of horizontal restraints between Bayer and generic producers that
seek to delay generic entry? There are competing possibilities. On
the one hand, federal courts may be unwilling to do anything that
could interfere in any way with a brand drug manufacturer's
ability to produce a constant stream of bioactive Cipro. Or,
following Secretary Thompson's lead, courts might be far less
willing to grant deference to the brand-drug manufacturers claims
of pro-competitive conduct.
This latter possibility is viable because it shows consistency
with context. The FTC already filed four complaints against
generic and brand-drug manufacturers who have entered into
agreements to delay generic entry."' The FTC and House and
Senate committees have all held hearings in the past eighteen
months on the relationship between patents, antitrust, and
prescription drug prices."' The House and the Senate have each
introduced bills regarding generic drug competition and antitrust
enforcement.13 In its recent report, the FTC explicitly endorses
the Senate's bill."' Secretary Thompson's threat means that all
branches of government are involved in the brand drug-generic
drug discourse: executive (Secretary Thompson and the FTC);
legislative (both houses of Congress); and of course, judicial.
The examination of the total enforcement landscape is part
and parcel of the historical approach to antitrust analysis.
"Antitrust law itself is only a segment of the total legal
111. See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing important critical provisions
within the relevant legislation).

112. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing details of the
committee's hearings).

113. Drug Competition Act of 2001, H.R. 1063, 107th Cong. (2001)
[hereinafter "Competition Act"]; Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals

Act of 2001, S. 812, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter "Access Act"].
114. Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent
Expiration:
An
FTC
Study,
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf, at vi (last visited Mar. 6,
2003).
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environment."" 5 Before turning to the few cases relating to the
generic Cipro issue, it is first worthwhile to examine the proposed
bills in Congress and the FTC Report. This approach is meant to
address each branch of government in turn, consistent with the
contextualist aspects of the historical approach.
Congressman Andrews introduced the House Bill regarding
generic drug competition. 116
The Congressional findings
specifically refer to the agreements at issue in this article.
Congress finds that ...(2) there is a potential for drug companies
owning patents on brand-name drugs to enter into private financial
deals with generic drug companies in a manner that could tend to
restrain trade and greatly reduce competition and increase
prescription drug costs for American citizens; and (3) enhancing
competition between generic drug manufacturers and brand name
manufacturers can 7significantly reduce prescription drug costs to
American families."
The House bill simply requires brand drug and generic
producers that enter into an agreement that "could have the effect
of limiting the research, development, manufacture, marketing, or
selling of a generic product" to notify the FTC and the Attorney
General. Notice that the legislative branch of government is
assigning enforcement powers" 8 and responsibility for monitoring
the issue to the executive branch, supporting the notion of a
discourse between different branches of the federal government
regarding generic drug competition.
The Senate bill, entitled the "Greater Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals Act of 2001," has more extensive plans for
stimulating generic drug competition. The Senate bill states that
Congress finds that... (4) the Federal Trade Commission has
discovered that there are increasing opportunities for drug
companies owning patents on brand-name drugs and generic drug
companies to enter into private financial deals in a manner that
could restrain trade ..

115. Carstensen, supra note 101, at 1195.
116. Drug Competition Act of 2001, H.R. 1063, 107th Cong. (2001). In the
Senate, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced an identical version of the Drug
Competition Act of 2001, S.754, 107th Cong. (2001). In a report released on
July 30, 2002, the FTC officially recommended the notice provisions of this bill
as a method of facilitating generic entry into a particular market. Federal
Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration:An FTC
Study, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf, at vii
(last visited Mar. 6, 2003).

117. The Drug Competition Act of 2001, S.754, 107th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (2001).
118. See Competition Act, supra note 113, § 7 (empowering the DOJ or the

FTC to seek civil penalties up to $20,000 per day per violation).
119. Access Act, supra note 113, § 2(a)(4).
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The findings also refer to the CBO Report, specifically noting
that "the market share held by generic pharmaceuticals compared
to brand-name pharmaceuticals has more than doubled in the last
decade, from approximately 19 percent to 43 percent."120 The
Access Act's purpose is in part to "ensure fair marketplace
practices and deter pharmaceutical companies (including generic
companies) from engaging in anticompetitive action or actions that
tend to unfairly restrain trade."12'
To that end, the teeth of the bill go to the 180-day exclusivity
period for the first ANDA filer, a generic producer. Amending the
Hatch-Waxman Act, the bill provides that the generic producer
with rights to the exclusivity period forfeits that right if it "fails to
market the drug within 90 days after the date" the FDA approves
the ANDA.1 2 Obviously, if such language were the law, generic
producers would be unable to enter into agreements to delay
generic entry, as such conduct would have its logical legs cut out
from under it. Such agreements would be useless after three
months, as a new generic producer (i.e., not the first filer) would
have rights to the 180-day exclusivity period. No such agreements
would be valid for longer than three months.
As a redundant measure, the bill also forces a generic
producer to forfeit its exclusivity rights if the producer "fails to get
tentative approval of the application within 30 months after the
This provision is
date on which the application is filed.""'
essentially the same 30-month extension period after a brand-drug
manufacturer files a patent infringement action that appears in
It also discourages a brand-drug
the Hatch-Waxman Act.
manufacturer from filing an infringement suit and negotiating to
delay generic entry into the market, as such a delay is at most
effective for two years. Such an agreement has only a limited life,
and cannot delay generic entry into the market in perpetua as
A Senate committee is currently
prior agreements did." 4
reviewing this bill, after earlier review by the House Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
The pharmaceutical industry has decried the attempted
amendment of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Pharmaceutical
Research & Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) argues that the
Hatch-Waxman Act is working as Congress intended and no

120. Id. § 2(a)(7).

121. Id. § 2(b)(2).
122. Id. § 3(a)(3)(c)(i)(I).
123. Id. § 3(a)(3)(c)(i)(IV).
124. See discussion supra Part II.C (noting the "genius" of the horizontal
restraints at issue is its ability to permanently delay generic entry into the

market via manipulation of the 30-day extension and 190-day exclusivity
period).
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compelling case has been made for changing the delicatelybalanced law that allows for both the development of newer, better
medicines and the faster introduction of generic medicines. 12 5

A

PhRMA witness testified before a House subcommittee that the
Hatch-Waxman Act is effectively meeting both of the objectives
Congress sought to achieve.2 6 PhRMA's perspective is that the
antitrust concerns are best left to the FTC's enforcement efforts
and that settlement of FTC complaints is effective." 7 "There is
[thus] no need to amend the Hatch-Waxman compromise to deal
with this issue.""8
Similarly, a PhRMA official stated on March 25, 2002 that
"attempts to re-open Hatch-Waxman [legislation] are at best shortsighted. They would seriously erode the incentive and protection
for innovation that enables new drug development, and would be a
devastating blow to America's patients.""29 "While generic drugs

serve an important purpose in today's world, they cannot and will
not ever offer the cutting-edge, life-saving innovation that modern
medicine and our patients demand.""'
Thus, consistent with the historical, contextualist approach to
antitrust analysis, this article has briefly surveyed several of the
major players in the dispute over generic drug competition: the
executive branch (FTC, DHHS); the legislative branch (each house
of Congress); and the private sector (pharmaceutical interest
groups).
Furthermore, the need for counter-terrorism
pharmaceuticals after 9/11 is relevant to describing the legal
culture in which the generic drug competition debate is enmeshed.
Finally, the continuous rise in prescription drug prices has obvious
bearing on the nature of pharmaceutical drug prices and generic
competition. What remains is to anticipate the judiciary's likely
response to the Cipro debate based on the existing conceptual
framework.
D. Whither Generic Drug Competition: The Recommended

125. Recent Developments Which May Impact Consumer Access To, and
Demand For, Pharmaceuticals: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Health, 107th Cong. 51, 53 (2001) (statement of Gregory J. Glover, physician
and attorney with the firm of Ropes & Gray, testifying on behalf of PhRMA).
126. Id. at 55 (stating that "the Hatch-Waxman compromise stimulates
competition and provides limited research incentives" and that the Act is
"balanced" in nature).
127. Id.
128. Id.

129. Statement By Richard I. Smith, PhRMA Vice President of Policy and
Research on the Theft of Innovation, available at http://www.phrma.org
publications/quickfacts/
25.03.2002.348.cfm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
130. Id.
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JudicialResponse
There are only three federal cases addressing Cipro and
generic drug competition, including Altman."' On January 10,
2001, Judge Trager transferred thirteen different state antitrust
suits regarding agreements to delay the entry of generic Cipro to
the Eastern District of New York, consistent with the rules of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML).132 These cases
come from seven different states: Arizona; California (five cases);
Florida (three cases); Illinois; Kansas; New York; and
Pennsylvania. 13 3 Neither Altman nor Meyers v. Bayer AG." have
yet been consolidated by the JPML, though motions are currently
pending in each case to do so.
Plaintiffs challenging an agreement between Bayer and Barr
to delay the entry of generic Cipro ought to prevail. Such a
recommendation of course depends on analysis of the total legal
environment the Cipro issue arises in. This article has been an
attempt to provide a rough picture of this environment. Beginning
with the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act, this article explored
the tension between the two objectives of that act: to facilitate
research and development and encourage generic competition."'
Economic data suggests that pharmaceutical prices remain higher
than inflation, but that generic drugs rapidly gain market share
after entry into the relevant market.'36 Concerned with rising
prescription drug prices, Congress has already drafted bills
attempting to enhance antitrust enforcement and diminish
pharmaceutical manufacturers' ability to delay generic entry into
the market by amending the Hatch-Waxman Act. 137 The FTC has
38
been fairly aggressive in challenging such horizontal restraints.
Finally, the perceived post-9/11 need for Cipro prompted a cabinet
president to threaten to unilaterally
member of a pro-deregulation
19
break Bayer's patent.

131. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing Bayer's
CIPRO infringement lawsuit against a generic manufacturer).
132. In re CiprofloaxocinHydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, No. 1383, 2001
WL 253240, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Jan. 10, 2001).
133. Id.
134. 143 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1053 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (granting stay pending

result of JPML proceedings).
135. See generally discussion supra Part II.
136. See discussion supra Part III (discussing the economic impact of generic
drug entry into the market).
137. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text (discussing legislation in

both houses of Congress, as well as the FTC).
138. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text (discussing the FTC's

challenges to horizontal restraints).
139. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (explaining the
government's ability to utilize compulsory licensing to counter bioterrorism).

The John Marshall Law Review

[36:557

Against this backdrop, courts may be unwilling to sanction
the conduct at issue in this article. Faced with (1) the economic
data suggesting brand drug manufacturers still achieve a
reasonable return on research and development, even as generics
gain greater market share; (2) the fact that Congress has already
expressed a desire, albeit a non-democratically confirmed desire
inasmuch as the bill is not law, to disallow the conduct Bayer has
committed; (3) the aggressive executive response to such
horizontal restraints; and (4) the perceived need for an extensive
supply of Cipro in the post-9/11 legal climate, it is difficult to
imagine a court permitting pharmaceutical manufacturers to
delay generic entry into the market. Such agreements run afoul of
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits
unreasonable restraints of trade.
This article has attempted to define "unreasonable" not solely
in terms of legal doctrine, but by examining the historical,
economic, political and contextual factors that necessarily specify
the contours of "unreasonable restraints of trade" as to generic
drug competition. An agreement between a brand drug and
generic drug producer to delay the latter's entry into the market is
an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
These restraints actually allow a brand drug manufacturer to
perpetually delay generic entry into the market by manipulating
the statutory scheme created by the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Whatever the pro-competitive effects of patents and market
exclusivity protections for brand drug manufacturers might be, a
restraint that effectively cuts off generic competition from a
particular therapeutic market eviscerates the balance Congress
sought to achieve in enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Furthermore, as Professor Carrier observes in his article,
facilitating innovation is a goal of antitrust law, as well as patent
law.'
Sanctioning horizontal restraints that "solve" the generic
competition problem simply elevates patent protections over
competitive considerations and does not necessarily foster
innovation.'
"To state that action within the scope of the patent
should automatically be immune from antitrust scrutiny (so the
incentives underlying the patent system are not diminished)
'solves' the patent-antitrust conflict only by according priority to

140. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
141. Carrier, supra note 12, at 801 (explaining that "[ilnnovation is the goal
of the patent system and one of several important (and becoming ever more so)

goals of the antitrust laws.").
142. See id. at 816 (suggesting that courts apply a test in patent-antitrust
disputes to determine "whether competition, rather than patents, is
responsible for innovation in the industry.").
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the patent laws.""'
Finally, through the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress sought to
encourage generic competition, not remove it altogether. However,
horizontal restraints, such as Bayer's agreement with Barr to
delay generic Cipro entry into the market, does exactly that by
removing generic competition by perpetually delaying it. Such
conduct is inconsistent with the objectives of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, is unwarranted by any economic or patent considerations, and
is perhaps even dangerous (to the extent restriction of a supply of
Cipro undermines national security and public health concerns).
Accordingly, courts faced with the issue should follow the FTC and
Congress' lead in disapproving of horizontal restraints that delay
generic drug entry.14 '

143. Id. at 764.
144. See Countering Delays In Introduction of Generic Drugs, 359 THE
LANCET 181 (approving of the U.S. efforts to preclude agreements delaying
generic drug entry). As a last note of caution, this article does not pretend
here to reject the brand-drug manufacturers' concerns over increasing generic
market share negatively impacting R&D returns. In fact, such claims have
merit, though are not necessarily as far-reaching as brand-drug
manufacturers maintain. The ever-increasing prescription drug prices are a
fundamental problem facing the health care market and brand-drug
manufacturers have the right to capitalize on their considerable R&D
Brand-drug manufacturers, moreover, have a legitimate
expenditures.
economic interest in reducing the free-rider problem posed by generic
imitators. The only point here is that horizontal restraints that delay generic
entry into the market are not the legally viable path for addressing the branddrug producers' concerns. What is the wisest path is beyond the scope of this
project.
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3OURCE: PhRMA Report, supra note 93, at 32.

